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We show that, under moral hazard, these divisions receive rents for incentive purposes, and
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Growth is a major objective for most ﬁrms. All types of organizations cannot accommodate expansion though. For instance, within
unitary-form(U-form) structures, expandingactivities rapidly causes theheadquarters' overload sinceheadquartersmakeboth strategic
and operational decisions (Chandler, 1966; Williamson, 1975). A solution is to adopt a multidivisional form (M-form), i.e., to delegate
operational decisions to divisions (Simon,1973). However, the choice of a structure cannot reduce to the overload issue since delegating
operational decisions impacts on incentives (Arrow,1974). In this paper,weprovide a theory for the choice of anorganizational structure
by a headquarters against the backdrop of the overload issuewhenmoral hazard plagues strategic and operational decisionmaking.We
extend our theory to analyze the decision to engage in acquisitions and joint ventures or resort to venture capitalists.
Consider a headquarters running a U-form enterprise that has two independent projects with the same potential. Each project is
proﬁtable if a relevant strategic decision and a relevant operational decision are made. Capabilities being limited, the headquarters
cannotmake the fourdecisions. Optimally, a headquarterswilling to run the largest possibleﬁrmwould delegate operational decisions
to divisions, i.e., make the ﬁrm adopt the M-form, and the ﬁrm would realize the two projects.
Under moral hazard, things are quite different. From the headquarters' perspective, the drawback of the M-form is that rents
must optimally be left to the divisions. The reason is the following. Making efﬁcient operational decisions requires costlyh.D. dissertation. Part of the revision took place while I was visiting the Saïd Business School, University o
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338 A. Renucci / Journal of Corporate Finance 14 (2008) 337–346unobservable efforts of investigation. Thus divisions must be provided with adequate incentives. When the cash-ﬂows (per unit of
investment) divisions receive for incentive purposes are lower than the (per unit of investment) net present value (NPV), the
headquarters makes a proﬁt on each unit of investment realized. Thus, investing as much as possible in the two projects is best.
Investment is not inﬁnite, however, since strategic decision making also requires costly unobservable efforts from the
headquarters, which raises the burden of moral hazard on ﬁnancing capacity. Reaching this limit makes divisions receive rents, i.e.,
cash-ﬂows in excess of their ﬁnancial contribution. Within the U-form, moral hazard problems, although of the same intensity,
interact differently: Being the only agent to make decisions, the headquarters earns all the NPV.
The advantage of the M-form is its larger investment capacity, and the resulting larger proﬁts. Two independent (but
complementary) reasons explain this pattern. First, under the M-form, the headquarters can pay back investors with the cash-
ﬂows of a successful divisionwhen the other division fails. Cross-pledging raises investment capacity. Second, more external funds
can be raised under the M-form since “internal” resources are – endogenously – larger. Indeed, a headquarters that organizes the
ﬁrm as anM-form is better off not creating two divisions from scratch. External growth should be privileged since theM-form then
beneﬁts from all the ﬁnancial resources of the unit it integrates (this unit accepts to become part of the ﬁrm since the cash-ﬂows it
subsequently receives for incentive purposes outweigh its ﬁnancial contribution, as discussed above). In contrast, a headquarters
that keeps running a U-form and sells out one project to obtain additional resources for the other project must charge a price
strictly lower than the acquirer's ﬁnancial resources. If not, the acquirer is left with no assets, which reduces its stake in the project,
thus its incentives, and in turn prevents it from obtaining funds.
Overall, the headquarters prefers theM-form if operationalmoral hazard is low, so that the divisions' rents are small, or if theﬁrm it
can integrate is rich. As discussed above, the resources of the latter havemore valuewithin anM-form. Thus, the investment capacity
effect outweighs the rent effect if these resources are sufﬁcient. Otherwise, the U-form is optimal, i.e., growth is rejected by the
headquarters. We derive empirical implications from these results. We delay their exposition after we present formally our theory.
A slight modiﬁcation of our initial framework allows us to consider other institutional arrangements. We ﬁrst consider a ﬁrm
that can acquire other companies just to beneﬁt from their ﬁnancial resources. Next, we consider a ﬁrm that can set up a joint
venture with another company to beneﬁt from its expertise on a speciﬁc task that is necessary to complete a project. Finally, we
consider the founder of a start-up ﬁrm who contemplates asking a venture capitalist to help him, which is not necessary to
complete the founder's project. In all these instances, adding an agent increases investment capacity and in turn proﬁts, but implies
to share these proﬁts, so that it is worth if the agent puts enough funds in.
Our research differs from agency literature that compares U- and M-forms since our focusing on strategic and operational
decisions allows us to bring headquarters in, and thus, to address the overload issue. In contrast, existing research (e.g., Inderst
et al., 2007) has little to say about headquarters' overload since it focuses on the separation of tasks among units (i.e., the U-form
groups activities by functions such as Production andMarketing, whereas theM-form groups activities by products). The exception
is Aghion and Tirole (1995). They conclude that, in their framework, one “should be theoretically agnostic about the overload
explanation” of moving to the M-form, but do not characterize formally the conditions under which the U-form dominates. In this
respect, our paper ﬁlls a gap in the literature. By endogenizing the projects' size, we show that rents and investment capacity are
critical factors: Overload alone cannot explain the change of structure. Focusing on the separation of tasks among units allows
existing theoretical research to compare the efﬁciency of M- and U-forms in allocating resources (Williamson, 1975; Inderst et al.,
2007), providing incentives (Williamson, 1975; Maskin et al., 2000), and favoring cooperation (Crémer, unpublished manuscript).
WithinM-forms, the distinct proﬁt centers (divisions), each for one product, should facilitate the transfer of resources to their most
proﬁtable uses1 and provide divisionmanagerswithmore effective incentives because it avoidsmoral hazard in teams (Williamson,
1975). Since the U-form can at most realize one project in what follows, the two structures are on a level playing ﬁeld in these
respects. The distinct proﬁt centers should also allow yardstick competition between divisions facing (some) common economic
conditions, and thus foster incentives (Maskin et al., 2000).2 This argument in favor ofM-forms is neutralized here since projects are
independent. It is meant to reﬂect that though theoretically seducing, this type of competition is not that widespread in practice.
Next, the present paper is connected to recent ﬁnancial literature that compares stand-alone and integrated ﬁrms by analyzing
the efﬁciency of internal capital markets within the latter, i.e., the transfers of resources between divisions, by the headquarters
(see Stein, 2003; Martin and Sayrak, 2003, for surveys). A prominent force of internal capital markets is the cross-pledging of cash-
ﬂows, or coinsurance effect identiﬁed by Lewellen (1971), that we extend here to the case where moral hazard has two dimensions
and is double-sided. A ﬁrst point of departure of our paper from this literature is that we let the projects' size depend on the funds
that can be raised externally, which is quite natural in most circumstances. In this context, overinvestment as in Matsusaka and
Nanda (2002), and strategic defaulting on the repayment of current debt as in Inderst and Müller (2003) have no bite. These
problems arise when retained earnings are sufﬁcient to ﬁnance future investments so that integrated ﬁrms are insulated from
external capital market discipline. A second point of departure of our paper from this literature is that we assume that the projects'
proﬁtability is identical and is common information. Thus, we avoid entering the ongoing debate as to whether integrating
productive units modiﬁes ﬁnancing costs by impacting on information asymmetry (e.g., Krishnaswami and Subramanian, 1999;
Huson and MacKinnon, 2003; Clarke et al., 2004; Berkovitch et al., 2006). Also, we can avoid addressing the controversial issue of1 However, U-forms are shown to have a higher ability to cope with resource allocation conﬂicts between divisions when ﬁrms have fewer products than
functions (Inderst et al., 2007).
2 The efﬁciency issue has also been addressed outside the agency literature. Qian et al. (2006) show that M-forms are more ﬂexible in choosing the scale o
experimentation of uncertain projects, whereas U-forms are technically more efﬁcient since units can specialize on speciﬁc functions. Qian et al. (2006) further
show that M- and U-forms have differing advantages regarding coordination.f
339A. Renucci / Journal of Corporate Finance 14 (2008) 337–346whether integrated ﬁrms misallocate resources (e.g., see Ahn and Denis, 2004; McNeil and Moore, 2005, for somewhat opposing,
recent results). Here, there is no room for “winner-picking” by headquarters (Stein, 1997) and the related positive effect of linking
future funding to future proﬁtability on the divisions' incentives to ﬁnd good projects (Inderst and Laux, 2005). There is no room
either for the dark side of winner-picking: Low effort (Stein, 1997; Brusco and Panunzi, 2005), rent-seeking3 and power-struggling
by some divisions (Harris et al., 1982; Meyer et al., 1992; Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. We analyze the different organizational
structures in Section 3. In Section 4, we examine the headquarters' preferred arrangement, derive empirical implications, and offer
other interpretations of the basic framework. Conclusions follow. We supply the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix A.
2. The model
Firm f has currently a U-form structure, is endowed with ﬁnancial resources A generated by past activities, and has two
investment projects.
The two projects are statistically independent and ﬁnancially identical. Investment is continuous-size. The amount Ij (with j=1,2)
invested inproject jnot only depends on internal resources but also on the funds that can be raised fromoutside investors. Each project
succeeds with probability p and fails with probability (1−p). Let p=ph if and only if a relevant strategic decision and a relevant
operational decision are simultaneously made. Making a relevant decision requires unobservable costly investigation efforts. Hence,
moral hazardhas two sources, each corresponding to one kindof decision. FollowingHolmströmand Tirole (1997),we assume that the
agent in charge of a decision either “works” or “shirks”. Working enables to make a relevant decision. Shirking is incompatible with
efﬁcient decision making but provides a private beneﬁt (or equivalently avoids a costly effort) BsIj (respectively, BOIj) regarding the
strategic (respectively, operational) decision. If either the relevant strategic choice or the relevant operational choice is not made, the
probability of success of a project decreases from ph to pl (with plbph). Project j yields RIj when it succeeds and zero when it fails. If
p=ph, the project exhibits a positive NPV per unit of investment: phR−1≥0. If p=pl, the NPV per unit of investment is strictly negative.
A prominent feature of U-forms is that headquarters are responsible for both strategic and operational decisions. In contrast,
headquarters delegate operational choices to divisions within M-forms. We assume that human capabilities are limited in the
sense that an agent can make at most two strategic decisions, or a strategic decision and an operational decision, but not two
operational decisions, i.e., managing two divisions at a time is impossible. Thus, the headquarters of f, denoted HQ f in what
follows, can (i) maintain the U-form of f, realize internally one project and sell out the other project, or (ii) make f adopt theM-form
in order to realize the two projects internally. In the latter case, we assume that HQ f allocates resources efﬁciently among divisions.
There are no exogenous savings or diseconomies from joint production.
There exists another U-form company, F, which has no project but is endowed with ﬁnancial resources α A. Investors are
competitive. Every party is risk-neutral and protected by limited liability.
We also make a couple of technical assumptions. First, moral hazard problems are sufﬁciently pronounced to have the
investment level ﬁnite in equilibrium: ph
BOþ 1kð ÞBs
Dp
 
NphR 1, with Dp¼d ph  pl and k¼d plplþph. Next, each moral hazard problem is
sufﬁciently limited to allow us to focus on the case where both HQ f and the divisions receive strictly positive net agency rents in
equilibrium under theM-form: ph BsDpbphR 1 and ph BODpbphR 1. Also, inducing HQ f toworkmust not be impossible. Thus, BOþBsDp bR
is required. Finally, setting plz 12 simpliﬁes the incentive scheme under the M-form.
In the next section, we consider the sharing rules of the cash-ﬂows between ﬁrms and investors, or within ﬁrms, that allow
projects to be funded.
3. Organizational structures
We successively examine two cases. In the ﬁrst case, HQ fmaintains the U-form structure of f and sells out one of the projects. In
the second case, HQ f changes the structure of f, i.e., moves f to the M-form, and undertakes the two projects internally.
3.1. Keeping the U-form structure and selling out one project
Without loss of generality, assume that HQ f realizes project 1 and sells out project 2. Consider project 1. HQ f and the investors
earn nothing when the project fails since the cash-ﬂows are then equal to zero and all parties are protected by limited liability. I1U
denotes the level of investment, D1U the payment to the investors when project 1 succeeds, and P the price received from the sale of
project 2. The objective of HQ f is to maximize its net expected revenue, i.e., the expected cash-ﬂows of the project net of any
payment to the investors, or ph(RI1U−D1U). The following constraints must be satisﬁed.
First, HQ fmust perform the level of investigation effort compatiblewithproper decisionmaking. It requires that its revenue should
be larger when it works thanwhen it shirks (private beneﬁt included), as summarized in Eq. (1).4 Observe that HQ f's potential private3 Resource misallocation can also result from, e.g., managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), empire building (Jensen, 1986; Aggarwal and
Samwick, 2006), and diversiﬁcation of human capital (Amihud and Lev, 1981).
4 Two remarks are in order here. First, the headquarters works when indifferent between doing so and enjoying a private beneﬁt. This pattern applies to every
agent in the model. Second, in limited liability absence, the design of the agents' incentives would be facilitated since agents could be punished when thei
project fails, e.g., be inﬂicted a non-monetary punishment such as being sent to jail. However, the absence of limited liability would not modify the essence of ou
results.r
r
340 A. Renucci / Journal of Corporate Finance 14 (2008) 337–346beneﬁt amounts to (BO+Bs)I1U sinceHQ f is in charge of strategic and operational decisions. Also observe thatHQ f prefers shirking on both
decisions to shirking on one decision since the probability of success of the project decreases from ph to pl if a decision is not adequate.
Second, HQ f must recoup the funds it invested in project 1, i.e., the initial resources A plus the price P received from the sale of
project 2 (characterized in Eq. (8) below), which is summarized in Eq. (2).
Third, investors must recoup the funds they invested, i.e., I1U− (A+P), which is summarized in Eq. (3).
Thus, HQ f solves the following program:since
implie
incent
help d
They d
5 Hen
conside
6 For
project
applies
7 Anomax
IU1 ;D
U
1
ph RI
U
1  DU1
 
s:t: ph RI
U
1  DU1
 
zpl RI
U
1  DU1
 þ BO þ Bsð ÞIU1 ð1Þ
ph RI
U
1  DU1
 
zAþ P ð2Þ
phD
U
1z I
U
1  Aþ Pð Þ: ð3Þ
e investors' participation constraint, Eq. (3), optimally binds since investors are competitive and not subject to moral hazard.Th
Substituting DU1 ¼ I
U
1  AþPð Þ
ph
into Eq. (1) and reorganizing shows that there exists an upper limit on the level of investment, i.e.,IU1 V
Aþ P
1 ph R BOþBsDp
 ¼d PI U1 ; ð4Þ
a marginal unit of investment raises the NPV by phR 1bph
BOþBs
Dp
 
. Rewriting Eq. (4) as ph
BOþBs
Dp
 
IU1  Aþ Pð ÞV phR 1ð ÞIU1
s that HQ f's (expected) net agency rent, i.e., the difference between the (expected) gross agency rent HQ f receives for
ive purposes, ph
BOþBs
Dp
 
IU1 , and its ﬁnancial input, (A+P), must be inferior to the project's (expected) NPV. The resources (A+P)
ecrease the net rent so that the level of investment and the external ﬁnancing capacity of the ﬁrm, I1U−(A+P), increase in (A+P).
ecreasewith the severity ofmoral hazard. Eq. (4) further shows that the twomoral hazard problems algebraically add upwithin
rm structure.5 Things will be different under the M-form.a U-fo
HQ f earns the project's NPV since investors just break even, which ensures that its participation constraint, Eq. (2), is veriﬁed.6
The NPV increases in I1U. Thus, the optimal level of investment satisﬁes Eq. (4) with equality.
Now consider project 2. It is in the interest of HQ f to sell the project which cannot be realized internally since the product of the
sale increases the amount of initial resources HQ f can contribute to project 1, and thus the investment capacity as appears in
Eq. (4). Again, every party earns a zero-payoff because of limited liability when project 2 fails. I2U denotes the level of investment in
project 2 and D2U the investors' revenue in case of success. The objective of HQ f is to maximize the price paid up-front by F to
acquire project 2.7 The following constraints must be respected. First, the headquarters of F (HQ F) must be induced to work, which
leads, by analogy with Eq. (1), it leads to Eq. (5). Next, HQ F must recoup the resources α A it invested: Its participation constraint,
given by Eq. (6), reﬂects that HQ F paid P to buy project 2, and further contributes (α A−P) to the investment in project 2. Finally, the
investors' participation constraint, given by Eq. (7), ensures that they recoup their funds, I2U− (α A−P).
To summarize, HQ f solves the following program:max
IU2 ;D
U
2
P
s:t: ph RIU2  DU2
 
zpl RI
U
2  DU2
 þ BO þ Bsð ÞIU2 ð5Þ
ph RI
U
2  DU2
 
z a A Pð Þ þ P ð6Þ
phD
U
2z I
U
2  a A Pð Þ: ð7Þ
ain, the investors' participation constraint optimally binds since investors are competitive and not subject to moral hazard:Ag
DU2 ¼
IU2 aAPð Þ
ph
. Substituting D2U into the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation constraint of HQ F leads to
P V aA 1 ph R BOþBsDp
 h i
IU2 and P≤ (phR−1)I2
U, respectively. Observe that raising I2U relaxes the participation constraint since phR−1N0 –
which allows HQ f to increase P – but has the opposite effect on the incentive constraint since 1 ph R BOþBsDp
 
N0. Thus, P is
maximized when the two constraints bind, which implies that IU2 ¼ aAph BOþBsDp
 ¼d PI U2 . Accordingly, HQ f receivesP ¼ phR 1
ph
BOþBs
Dp
  aAN0 ð8Þce, it extends Tirole's (2005) result that the ﬁnancing capacity of a ﬁrm decreases with the severity of the one-dimension moral hazard problem he
rs to the case of a U-form structure where moral hazard has two dimensions.
the sake of brevity, we do not check in the text that limited liability is respected when the project succeeds. Since HQ f receives a zero-revenue when
1 fails, the fact that its participation constraint is overall satisﬁed ensures that HQ f receives a positive revenue when the project succeeds. This remark
to the investors, and to project 2 as well.
ther interpretation would be that the headquarters sells the second project to an engineer as part as a corporate venture capital program. See Section 4.
8 If a
Howeve
because
9 To b
w≥phplW
Setting
investm
341A. Renucci / Journal of Corporate Finance 14 (2008) 337–346Q F makes no proﬁt. Observe that the price HQ F pays up-front to acquire project 2 limits its future ﬁnancial contribution to theand H
project, which raisesD2U, for a given level of I2U. In turn, it reduces the fraction of the cash-ﬂows HQ F receives when project 2 succeeds,
whichweakens incentives, diminishes proﬁts, and thus imposes an upper limit on P. Since Pbα A, the positive impact of the additional
resources derived by HQ f from the sale of project 2 on the amount that can be invested in project 1 is limited.
Proposition 1 characterizes the overall gain of HQ f. It corresponds to the product of the NPV per unit of investment and the
investment realized in project 1 given by Eq. (4), where P is determined in Eq. (8).
Proposition 1. When HQ f keeps f under the U-form, it earnsphR 1ð Þ
1þ a phR1
ph
BOþBs
Dp
 
1 ph R BOþBsDp
 
2
64
3
75A: ð9Þ
now consider the case where the two projects are realized under the same roof.We
3.2. Adopting the M-form structure and realizing the two projects
Undertaking the two projects internally forces HQ f to alter the ﬁrm's organizational structure: HQ f delegates operational decision
making to division j (with j=1,2) as far as project j is concerned.Without loss of generality, let division1 be formerU-form independent
ﬁrm Fwith assets α A (but without a project) that HQ f acquires and integrates within an enlarged company,M. Division 2 is created
from scratch. We later compare this solution with the alternative which consists in creating the two divisions from scratch.8
Again, limited liability imposes that all parties receive a zero-revenue when both projects fail. DM denotes the investors'
revenue when the two projects succeed, djM the investors' revenue when only project j succeeds, rj division's j revenue when j's
project succeeds, and IjM the investment in j.
HQ f maximizes its net revenue. Here, the latter is equal to ph2[∑(RIjM−rj)−DM]+ph(1−ph)∑(RIjM− rj−djM), i.e., the expected cash-
ﬂows of the projects net of any payments to the investors and the divisions. The following constraints must be satisﬁed.
First, divisions should face proper incentives. Observe that allocating rjN0 to j whose project succeeds whatever the result of
the other division fosters j's incentives since projects are independent. Also, punishing j by setting rj=0 when j's project fails
whatever the result of the other division fosters j's incentives. Thus, j is induced to exert the effort that is necessary to make an
adequate operational decision if Eq. (10) is veriﬁed. Division 1 and division 2 contribute α A and 0, respectively, to their project so
that their participation constraints are summarized by Eq. (11).
Next, HQ f must perform the level of investigation effort compatible with proper decision making. It requires that its revenue
should be larger when it works on the two projects than when it shirks on the two projects. It writes ph2W+2ph(1−ph)w≥pl2W+
2pl(1−pl)w+Bs(I1M+ I2M), whereW and w denote HQ f's revenue when two projects succeed and one project succeeds, respectively.
Setting w=0 relaxes the constraint since phNplz 12. The intuition is that a high probability of success of a project commands to be
particularly severe for incentive reasons in case of failure. Setting w=0 also increases the cash-ﬂows the investors receive when
one out of the two projects fails. Replacing W by R(I1M+ I 2M)− (r1+ r2)−DM and manipulating leads to HQ f's incentive compatibility
constraint, summarized by Eq. (12).9 HQ f's participation constraint, given by Eq. (12), takes into account that HQ f's contribution to
the projects is A, and that w=0. HQ f's reduced objective function derives from Eq. (13).
Finally, the investors' participation constraint, Eq. (14), takes into account that the investors provide (I1M+ I2M)−A(1+α) to theﬁrm.
To summarize, HQ f solves the following program:max
IM1 ; I
M
2 ; r1; r2
DM ;dM1 ; d
M
2
p2h R I
M
1 þ IM2
  r1 þ r2ð Þ  DM 
s:t: phr1zplr1 þ BOIM1 ; phr2zplr2 þ BOIM2 ð10Þ
phr1za A; phr2z0 ð11Þ
ph þ plð ÞDp R IM1 þ IM2
  r1 þ r2ð Þ  DM zBs IM1 þ IM2  ð12Þ
p2h R I
M
1 þ IM2
  r1 þ r2ð Þ  DM zA ð13Þ
p2hD
M þ ph 1 phð Þ dM1 þ dM2
 
z IM1 þ IM2
  A 1þ að Þ: ð14Þ
e investors' participation constraint optimally binds since investors are competitive and not subject to moral hazard.Thsecond U-form independent unit with resources but without a project existed, the M-form could also beneﬁt from these resources by integrating that unit
r, business life shows that this scenario, i.e., integrating independent units several at a time, is quite unrealistic since integration is difﬁcult to handle
of, e.g., differences in ﬁrms' culture (e.g., Weber et al., 1996). The results for this case are available from the author upon request.
e complete, HQ f must also be induced to work on the two projects rather than on j's project. This conditionwrites in its extensive form as ph2W+2ph(1−ph
+[pl(1−ph)+ (1−pl)ph]w+BsIjM, and reduces to phW  2ph  1ð Þwz
Bs IMj
Dp . Condition (12) writes in its reduced form as ph þ plð ÞW  2 ph þ pl  1ð ÞwzBs I
M
1 þIM2ð Þ
Dp
w=0 relaxes both constraints since phNplz 12. Observe that inducingHQ f towork on twoprojects rather than on zero project is themost stringent constraint i
ents in the two projects are not too dissimilar, i.e., plph V
IM1
IM2
V phpl . This pattern is shown below to be optimal..
)
.
f
342 A. Renucci / Journal of Corporate Finance 14 (2008) 337–346The divisions' incentive compatibility constraints optimally bind. To see this, suppose j's does not. Let rj be ﬁxed. Then, raising IjM
while keeping rj constant and still satisfying Eq. (10) is possible. Raising IjM has no impact on Eq. (11). It relaxes Eq. (12). To see this,
(i) substitute djM=RIjM−rj into Eq. (14) satisﬁed with equality, and the resulting expression of DM into Eq. (12), which leads to
ph R 1kð ÞBsDp
 
 1
h i
IM1 þ IM2
  ph r1 þ r2ð Þ þ A 1þ að Þz0 where k¼d plplþph, and (ii) recall that ph R BsDp
 
 1N0. Raising IjM also
increasesHQ f's revenue, and thus relaxes Eq. (13). To see this, substituteDM intoHQ f's revenue function,which leads to (phR−1)(I1M+i2M)−
ph(r1+r2)+α A≥0 and recall that phR−1≥0. Hence, rj ¼
BOIMj
Dp .
Substituting rj into the divisions' participation constraints shows that a minimum level of investment exists at the division
level: IM1 z
aA
ph
BO
Dp
and I2M≥0. Substituting rj into HQ f's incentive compatibility constraint shows that an upper limit also exists:obtain
impac
makes
pledgi
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fact tha
ﬂows reIM1 þ IM2 V
1þ að ÞA
1 ph R BOþ 1kð ÞBsDp
 ¼d PI M : ð15Þ
e upper and lower limits are compatible. Eq. (15) indicates that the maximum level of investment and the external ﬁnancingTh
capacity of the multidivisional ﬁrm increase in A and α, and decrease with the severity of moral hazard as in the U-form case.
However, comparing I
PM toP
I U ¼d
1þ a phR1
ph
BOþBs
Dp
  	A
1 ph R BOþBsDp
  ; ð16Þ
ed by combining Eqs. (4) and (8), shows two major differences. First, the lower denominator of I
PM, as evidenced by the
t of kN0, reﬂects the possibility ofM to reimburse investors with the cash-ﬂows of a successful division if the other division
losses, which relaxes credit constraints. This pattern is referred to as cross-pledging in the literature.10 The fact that cross-
ng increases the ﬁnancing capacity of an M-form evenwhen moral hazard has two dimensions and is double-sided extends
sult of Lewellen (1971). Intuitively, the full beneﬁt of cross-pledging is obtained when investments in the two projects are
imilar. A contrario, investing in only one project would cancel this effect. Also, the full beneﬁt of cross-pledging is obtained
projects are independent. This pattern is consistent with empirical evidence that conglomerate mergers are very strongly
ated by the objective of enjoying ﬁnancial synergies (Walter and Barney, 1990). Second, the numerator of I
PM is larger
he numerator of I
PU since the price paid by F to acquire project 2 – hence the additional wealth for HQ f – is strictly lower than
incentive purposes. These two reasons imply that investment is higher under theM-form than under theU-form.We refer to
operty as the “investment capacity effect”.this pr
Investing I
PM is optimal for HQ f since its revenue increases in the level of investment.11 To see this, combinedjM=RIjM−rj, Eqs. (10) and
(14) both satisﬁed with equality with Eq. (13), and recall that ph
BO
DpbphR 1. It implies that acquiring the ﬁrm endowed with ﬁnancial
resources but no project is preferred to setting up the two divisions from scratch. According to Eq. (15), I
PM is such thatph
1 kð ÞBsPI M
Dp
 A
" #
þ ph
BO
P
I M
Dp
 aA
" #
¼ phR 1ð Þ
P
I M: ð17Þ
words, the sumof HQ f's net agency rent and the divisions' aggregate net agency rents is optimally equal to theNPV. Observe that
isions' aggregate net rents are strictly lower than the NPV since ph
BO
DpbphR 1. Thus, HQ f's net rent is strictly positive when Eq.
lds,which ensures that HQ f's participation constraint, Eq. (13), is satisﬁed.12 Symmetrically, observe thatHQ f's net rent is strictly
than the NPV since ph
Bs
DpbphR 1. Thus, whatever the level of the divisions' input, the aggregate net rents of the divisions are
positivewhen Eq. (17) holds, i.e., at the optimum. In otherwords, HQ f prefers leaving a rent to the divisions and investingmore
king them just recoup the funds they contributed to the projects. It is important to remark that it is not the addition of another
ofmoral hazard thatdrives thedivisions' strictly positivenet rents— indeed there is no additional sourceofmoral hazard. Rather,
e fact that the two sources of moral hazard (strategic and operational) interact in a different way as compared to the case of a U-
The “rent effect” implies that HQ f does not earn the whole NPV of the two projects. Proposition 2 characterizes its revenue.his paper, we normalize to one the number of projects that can be realized under the U-form, so that the latter does not beneﬁt from cross-pledging. In
, U-forms can accommodate several projects. Our assumption is simply meant to reﬂect that the extent of cross-pledging is larger under M-forms since
er can accommodate more projects than U-forms.
e phR−1≥0, each unit of investment raises the NPV. Thus, I
P M not only maximizes HQ f's revenue but also the NPV.
the sake of brevity, we do not check in the text that limited liability is respected. The investors' revenue when j's project succeeds is dMj ¼ R BODp
 
IMj N0
venue when two projects succeed is DM ¼ R BOþ
Bs
phþpl
Dp

 
IM1 þ IM2
 
z0 since plz 12. Thus, the investors' limited liability is respected. Since the divisions
a zero-revenue when their project fails, the fact that their participation constraint is overall satisﬁed ensures that they receive a positive revenue when
oject succeeds, so that the sharing rule of the cash-ﬂows also respects their limited liability. Finally, since HQ f receives a zero-revenue if a project fails, the
t its participation constraint is overall satisﬁed ensures that its revenue when the two projects succeed is positive, so that the sharing rule of the cash-
spects HQ f's limited liability..
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h i
1 ph R BOþ 1kð ÞBsDp
  1
2
4
3
5A: ð18Þ
consider the choice of organization HQf makes in the next section.We
4. Optimal organization
Our objective in this section is twofold. First, we determine the organizational structure that HQ f prefers. Next, we propose
alternative interpretations of our basic framework. Throughout this section, we discuss the results and derive empirical implications.
4.1. The headquarters' choice
HQ f faces the following trade-off. On the one hand, altering the structure of the ﬁrm in order to adopt the M-form increases
proﬁts: Whatever the organizational structure, the NPV per unit of investment is phR−1 but the level of investment is higher under
the M-form. On the other hand, HQ f must share the NPV with the divisions under the M-form. Its ﬁnal choice depends on the
magnitude of BO and Bs, and the resources F is endowed with, measured by α. This choice is detailed in the next proposition.
Everything else being equal, we assume that HQ f prefers running a company as large as possible.
Proposition 3. There exist a real number
P
Bs, and real-valued functions PBO Bsð Þ,
P
BO Bsð Þ and Pa BO;Bsð Þ such that:
(i) HQ f moves f to the M-form whenBOVPBO Bsð Þ;
P
BO Bsð ÞbBOb
P
BO Bsð Þ and az Pa BO;Bsð Þ;
BOz
P
BO Bsð Þ; azPa BO;Bsð Þ and BszPBs:
Otherwise, HQ f keeps f under the U-form.(ii)
The intuition for these results is the following. When operational moral hazard is low, i.e., BOVPBO, it is optimal for HQ f to have f
adopt anM-form since divisional net agency rents are small. Next, suppose that moral hazard pertaining to operational decisions is
moderate, i.e.,
P
BObBOb
P
BO. Observe from Eqs. (9) and (18) that the derivative of the headquarters' revenuewith respect to α is higher
under the M-form than under the U-form. In other words, the ﬁnancial resources of F have more value for HQ f inside an M-form
than inside a U-form. Thus, the M-form is all the more attractive as F is endowed with large resources. If these resources are
sufﬁcient, i.e., az
P
a, the investment capacity effect dominates the rent effect, and HQ fmodiﬁes the structure of the company. If these
resources are insufﬁcient, HQ f prefers to keep the ﬁrm under the U-form, and the ﬁrm does not grow. Finally, when operational
moral hazard is pronounced, i.e., BOz
P
BO, either BsbPBs and HQ f prefers running a U-form since its own rent is too small under theM-
form, or BszPBs and HQ f faces the same trade-off as above.
We derive a couple of testable empirical implications from the above results. All else equal,
• The larger the resources of a ﬁrmwithout projects (e.g., characterized by a lowmarket to book ratio), themore likely this ﬁrmwill be
the target of ﬁrms endowed with projects (e.g., characterized by a high market to book ratio), instead of the buyer of such projects.
This implication allows us to characterize the circumstances under which “ﬁnancial acquisitions”, i.e., acquisitions of other
companies in order to beneﬁt from their cash resources, occur (see, e.g., Grinblatt and Titman, 2001, for a categorization of
mergers and acquisitions).
• Controlling for α, the size of projects realized internally should be larger than the size of projects realized externally (e.g., through
a corporate venture capital program).Indeed, suppose that α=1 so that ﬁnancial endowments are comparable. The size of f, given
by ^I
U
1 ¼
d
1þ phR1
ph
BOþBs
Dp
 
 !
A
1ph RBOþBsDp
  , is larger than the size of F, given by ^IU2 ¼d Aph BOþBsDp . Corporate venture capital programs (e.g., by Intel,
Microsoft, etc.) offer engineers the opportunity to set up their own ﬁrm based on an innovation they have discovered during their
employment period. Suppose that laws protecting intellectual property prevent employees from stealing the innovation, i.e., they
have to buy it from their current employer before establishing their own business. Reinterpreting our results along these lines
suggests that these projects should be of smaller size than their counterparts realized internally.
• Controlling for α, the size of the projects realized by M-form structures should be on average larger than the size of the projects
realized by U-form structures.
Again, suppose that α=1 and compare
P
I
M
2 ¼ A1ph RBOþ 1kð ÞBsDp
  to ^IU1þ ^I U22 . This result is reinforced by the fact that headquarters
prefer to runM-forms if α is high enough. The evidence reported in Villalonga (2004) supports the implication. Simple computations
344 A. Renucci / Journal of Corporate Finance 14 (2008) 337–346show that the segments of single-segment ﬁrms are 1.8 times smaller than the segments of multisegment ﬁrms in terms of
employment (2.2 times smaller in terms of assets), for ﬁrms included in the Compustat database. These results are robust to the
various samples and databases considered in the paper even though the orders of magnitude slightly differ.
Proposition 4 details some comparative statics results.
Proposition 4. The M-form is:
(i) More attractive to HQ f when, keeping B0+Bs constant, Bs increases;
(ii) Less attractive to HQ f when B0 increases.
The intuition for result (i) is the following. When the sum of the intensities of the moral hazard problems is kept constant but Bs
increases, HQ f obtains a higher rent per unit of investment at the expense of the divisions under theM-form, whereas its rent per unit of
investment under the U-form is unaffected. Moreover, the investment capacity and the proﬁts are unaffected under the U-form, whereas
they increase under theM-form, thanks tok. One implication of this result is that one should observeﬁrmsmoving from theunitary to the
multidivisional structurewhen they facemore uncertainty regarding strategic issues and less uncertainty regarding operational issues. To
put it into perspective, note that the M-form became very popular in the United States after the end of World War II, once the biggest
American ﬁrms mastered new technologies but faced strategic challenges on how to diversify their activity.
A higher BO makes the M-form a less attractive alternative to HQ f since the investment capacity is reduced and the divisions'
rents increase. Result (ii) is consistent with the idea that centralization (here, keeping the U-form) is an increasing function of the
control cost of transferring decisions from the headquarters to the divisions (see, e.g., Christie et al., 2003).13 More generally, a
higher BO can justify corporate asset downsizing (asset sales, division spinoffs, etc.14) for existingM-form companies, or even, make
the U-form an attractive alternative for such ﬁrms.
We now consider alternative interpretations of our basic framework.
4.2. Other interpretations
We slightly alter our initial assumptions to allow for other interpretations of our basic framework. Suppose that X – an
entrepreneur or a ﬁrm – has only one project and owns ﬁnancial assets A. Y – another ﬁrm or a ﬁnancial intermediary – has no
project but owns α A. Two tasks must be performed in order to achieve the project. Either task 1 and task 2 are performed by X, or
task 1 is performed by X while task 2 is performed by Y. Unless otherwise stated, our initial set of assumptions applies.
4.2.1. Acquisitions
Suppose that ﬁrm X considers acquiring Y, a ﬁrm that used to commercialize the same product or service as X, but is currently
lacking theﬁnancialmuscle to operate as a stand-alone. The cost of effort or private beneﬁt pertaining to task 1 (respectively, task 2)
is B1 (respectively, B2). Without loss of generality let B1NB2. Pooling their resources and working together on production would
allow X to raise more external funds so as to operate a larger plant than X could operate separately.15 This pattern is consistent with
long-standing empirical evidence that horizontal mergers try to exploit ﬁnancial synergies (Chatterjee, 1986; Walter and Barney,
1990). Without Y, X earns phR1ð ÞA
1ph RB1þB2Dp
 , i.e., the product of phR−1, the NPV per unit of investment, and the investment, A
1ph RB1þB2Dp
 . If
acquiring Y, proﬁts are larger since investment is multiplied by (1+α). However, X has to share these proﬁts with Y for incentive
purposes, resulting in a revenue of 1það Þph
B1
Dp
1ph RB1þB2Dp
  1 	A. Thus, it is worth acquiring Y if Y is rich enough, which translates, here, into az B2B1.
4.2.2. Joint venture
Suppose now that Y has a comparative advantage in performing task 2 in the sense that its cost of effort is lower or its
reputation is more established: The private beneﬁt is B2 if task 2 is performed by X, and δ B2 with δb1 if task 2 is performed by Y.
For example, let X be a French ﬁrmwilling to set foot on the Russian automobile market. Y is a Russian ﬁrm that perfectly knows its
national market. X and Y could form a joint venture: X would produce cars and Y would use its network to commercialize them.
Again, it is worth collaborating with Y (i.e., beneﬁting from Y's expertise to increase the NPV per unit investment, which in turn
raises investment capacity and thus total proﬁts) provided that Y is rich enough, i.e., az dB2B1 . Of course, setting up a joint venture is
all the more desirable as the comparative advantage of Y in performing task 2 is signiﬁcant, i.e., δ is low.
4.2.3. Venture capital
Finally, let X be an entrepreneur and Ya venture capitalist (VC) or a business angel. Suppose that task 2 is no longer necessary to
realize the project. However, if performed by Y, it increases the cash-ﬂows in case of success of the project byDR. This assumption is
meant to reﬂect that the VC advises the entrepreneur (regarding, e.g., the ﬁrm's strategy, its marketing policy, the recruiting of key
personnel), and helps the latter securing funds from other investors (e.g., banks or other VCs when the VC under consideration acts
as the leader of a syndicate). Further assume that the VC's help is valuable only to the extent that the entrepreneur works. Contrary
to themaintained hypothesis, and consistentwith the fact that only task 1 is necessary to realize the project, let ph R B1Dp
 
 1b0 to13 An increase in Bs has no clear-cut implications. On the one hand, it increases the fraction of the proﬁts that HQ f receives under the M-form. On the other
hand, it decreases the investment capacity, and in turn the proﬁts to be shared.
14 For recent literature, see, e.g., Denis and Shome (2005), and Ahn and Walker (2007).
15 Observe that if Y stopped production, Y would be equivalent to a ﬁnancier and its ﬁnancial input would not allow X to increase the total amount borrowed.
345A. Renucci / Journal of Corporate Finance 14 (2008) 337–346have informational frictions impose a limit on the level of investment. By involving the VC in the project, the entrepreneur increases
theNPV per unit of investment, and thus the investment capacity and the proﬁts. However, since the entrepreneurmust share these
proﬁts with the VC for incentive purposes, it is worth addressing the latter if and only if az B2DpDR
B1Dpph phR1ð Þ
. In words, the VC's ﬁnancial
contribution to the project must be sufﬁcient. Naturally, the above threshold decreases in δR, the VC's incremental ability. Other
theoretical papers model the desirability of addressing VCs. By assuming that the project's size is ﬁxed and the VC's wealth is
unlimited, Casamatta (2003) does not leave room for outside investors. In contrast, the latter are valuable here, which is consistent
with the observation that an active VC is generally not the sole investor to put money in a start-up company. The same remark
applies to Inderst andMüller (2004), Renucci (2000), Repullo and Suarez (2004), and Schmidt (2003), since the project's size is also
assumed to be ﬁxed in these papers.
To summarize, the trade-off between increasing investment capacity and proﬁts, and sharing these proﬁts, that we identiﬁed in
the M-form versus U-form case also applies to other situations.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper shows that the organizational structure of a ﬁrm impacts on its ﬁnancing capacity, its proﬁts, and how these proﬁts
are shared. The advantage of the moving to the multidivisional structure for the headquarters of a unitary structure concerned
about overload is the investment capacity effect which raises proﬁts. The drawback ofmoving to themultidivisional structure is the
rent effect, i.e., the fact that delegating decisions to divisions implies to leave them agency rents whatever their ﬁnancial
contribution to their project. Thus, overload does not automatically imply adopting a multidivisional structure. The same trade-off
between raising investment capacity and proﬁts, and sharing these proﬁts can explain the choice of ﬁrms to engage in acquisitions
or form joint ventures, and of entrepreneurs to address venture capitalists. The understanding of other institutional arrangements
such as matrix-type organizations which exhibit a complex nexus of decision makers is left for future research. Recently, the
efﬁciency of these organizations has been argued by practitioners and thematrix form abandoned by a number of ﬁrms. A possible
explanation, consistent with our results, is that this kind of structure involves too large and too many agency rents. We also leave
for future research the design of an optimal organizational structure based on incentives problems in the spirit of the recent
literature on the design of institutions that focuses on information processing (e.g., Radner, 1992; Radner and Van Zandt, 1992; Van
Zandt, 1998), the organization of knowledge acquisition in production (Garicano, 2000), or more generally, coordination (e.g.,
Crémer,1980; Qian et al., 2006). A force of this literature is that organizational structures are usually obtained rather than assumed.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 3. HQ f prefers the M-form when the revenue given by Eq. (9) is lower than the revenue given by Eq. (18),
which reduces towhere
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have PRHS≥0 when BOV BO Bsð Þ, where BO Bsð Þ¼d
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we use (i) the signs of the coefﬁcients of PRHS which imply that (ii) PRHS always has two distinct roots and that (iii) the lower root is
negative, and (iv) the fact that the upper root veriﬁes phR 1Nph BODpNph R 1kð ÞBsDp
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 1.
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BO Bsð Þ and Bsb Bs , or when Bsz Bs . To show this, we use: (i) the signs of the coefﬁcients of PLHS; (ii)Bes P P
the fact that if Bsb
Dp phR1ð Þ
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p ¼dPBs (with PBsN
P
Bs), PLHS has two positive and distinct roots, with the upper root not satisfying
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BO
DpbphR 1, and the lower root satisfying ph R 1kð ÞBsDp
 
 1bph BODp 8Bs, and ph BODpbphR 1 when BsbPBs ; (iii) the fact that if
Bsz
P
Bs , which is compatible with ph
Bs
DpbphR 1, PLHS has at most one root which does not satisfy ph BODpbphR 1.
Assume that everything else equal, the headquarters prefers running the largest possible company. First, let us distinguish
between two cases.
Case 1. BsbPBs . Comparing PBO Bsð Þ and
P
BO Bsð Þ shows that
P
BO Bsð ÞNPBO Bsð Þ. When BOz
P
BO Bsð Þ, Eq. (19) is never veriﬁed since PLHS≥0
and PRHSb0. WhenPBO Bsð ÞbBOb
P
BO Bsð Þ, Eq. (19) is veriﬁed if az PRHSPLHS ph
BOþBs
Dp
 
¼d
P
a BO;Bsð Þ, with Pa BO;Bsð ÞN0 since PLHSb0 and PRHSb0.
When BOVPBO Bsð Þ, Eq. (19) is always veriﬁed since PLHSb0 and PRHS≥0.
Case 2. BszPBs . When BONPBO Bsð Þ, Eq. (19) is veriﬁed if azPa BO;Bsð Þ. When BOVPBO Bsð Þ, Eq. (19) is always veriﬁed since PLHSb0 and
PRHS≥0.
Finally, let us summarize these results as: HQ f moves the ﬁrm to the M-form when (i) BOVPBO Bsð Þ, (ii) PBO Bsð ÞbBOb
P
BO Bsð Þ and
az
P
a BO;Bsð Þ, and (iii) BOz
P
BO Bsð Þ, azPa Bs;BOð Þ and BszPBs . Otherwise, HQ f keeps the U-form structure of the ﬁrm. It establishes
Proposition 3.
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